The Transcendental Aesthetic

Intuition and sensation

A representation of an object is an intuition of that object if and only if it is a direct relation to that object. Intuition of an object accounts for knowledge of that object, and so it accounts for knowledge about that object.

I intuit an object that exists apart from my representation of that object if and only if that object is given to me. In that case, intuition is reception, or receptive representation. My reception of an object is a sensory affection, or an affection of the senses, by that object if and only if it is a transaction in which that object is the agent and I am the patient.

If an intuition is a sensory affection, it is an empirical intuition, and the intuited object is an appearance, or a sensible. One sensory affection comprises many sensory effects: that sensory affection is an empirical intuition, and each of those sensory effects is a sensation. An empirical intuition is a manifold of sensation.

Sensations are to empirical intuitions as matter is to form. The matter of the representation of an object is the representation of the matter of that object. If a representation of an object is a manifold of sensation, it is a representation of that object as a material object. An empirical intuition is a sort of representation of an object as a material object.

Empirical intuitions are to sensations as form is to matter. The form of the representation of an object is the representation of the form of that object. If a representation of an object is an empirical intuition, it is a representation of that object as an ordered whole. An empirical intuition is a sort of representation of an object as an ordered whole.

An inner intuition, a sort of manifold of sensation, is a sort of representation of an object as a temporally ordered whole. An outer intuition, a sort of manifold of sensation, is a sort of representation of an object as a spatially and temporally ordered whole.

A temporally ordered whole is represented before any object is represented as a temporally ordered whole. That representation is time. A spatially ordered whole is represented before any object is represented as a spatially ordered whole. That representation is space.

If an object exists apart from my representation of that object, the manner in which that object exists is not the manner in which I represent that object: its matter in itself is not its matter for me, and its form in itself is not its form for me.